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Phishing is a form of fraud where an attacker
attempts to acquire sensitive information from a target
by posing as trustworthy. One strategy to fool the
target is spoofing of a legitimate website. But why do
people fall for phishing, and what security indicators
are utilized or not utilized when deciding the legitimacy
of a website? Hitherto, two studies have been
conducted in 2006 and 2015. As time has passed
since then, we like to check if people are meanwhile
more certain in identifying spoofed websites. Therefore,
20 participants were observed when they analyzed and
classified websites as legitimate or spoofed. On average
participants had a success rate of 69 %, like previous
studies results. The URL was used as an indicator
by most of the participants (80 %), indicating user
behavior and ease of identifying spoofed and legitimate
websites is not very different on a smartphone compared
to a desktop. Almost all participants used the content
of the website at least once when deciding if a website
was spoofed or legitimate. These findings will be used to
conduct a bigger study to create more resilient results.
1. Introduction
Cybercrime is becoming more and more
sophisticated and cyber criminals reached $ 3.5
billion in profits in 2019 [1], while phishing and
extortion are the most common ways of scamming
people. Phishing is a form of fraud where an attacker
attempts to acquire sensitive information from a target
by posing as a trustworthy entity [2]. The goal of
phishing is often monetary gain by getting access to the
targets information or access privileges [2].
Phishing is one of the largest security threats and
contributes to 90 % of all data breaches [3]. In 2018,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated losses of
$ 12 billion for companies worldwide due to phishing
[4]. Commonly, attacker spoof a website and send a link
to the target insisting that an action is required. On the
website the target is asked to enter credentials that are
monetized or allow access to sensitive information [5].
According to the Anti Phishing Working Group,
the number of phishing websites in September 2019
were at the highest level since 2016 [6]. Hitherto,
two studies have elaborated how spoofing websites
fool users [7, 8]. However, since the last study five
years have past and we plan to check if the findings
of these studies are still eligible. In a first step, we
like to determine the relevant aspects in a smaller
study that will then be used in a second step for a
broader study. Therefore, we examine what makes a
phishing website convincing, and what methods users
utilize to determine the legitimacy of a website when
viewing it on a smartphone. This was examined through
interviews where the participants were shown a random
sample of websites (both legitimate and spoofed). The
participants then decided if each of the websites were
spoofed or legitimate. Previous studies have examined
this in a desktop computer environment, but there is a
lack of studies examining phishing susceptibility among
smartphone users.
Our methodology is based on the methods used in
the studies Why Phishing Works [7] and Why Phishing
Still Works [8], but on smartphones instead of desktop
computers. Smartphone phishing is a relevant subject
to examine further since a majority of website traffic in
2019 came from mobile devices [9]. More concretely,
we like to answer following research question in our
work:
What are indicators that users utilize or fail to utilize to
decide whether a website is legitimate or spoofed on a
smartphone?
We expect that the URL (Uniform Resource Locator)
is probably one of the most commonly used indicators
when a user decides if a website is legit. Dhamija et al.
[7] discovered that 77 % of the participants evaluated
the address bar to make judgements on a websites
legitimacy, 32 % used the padlock icon while only 9 %
used certificates. Evaluating the sites overall design and
functionality is probably the most common strategy (in





combination with other strategies), which was observed
by both Dhamija et al. [7] and Alsharnouby et al. [8].
It is possible that more users will be able to correctly
identify which websites are spoofed or legitimate on a
smartphone than on desktop since there is less screen
area to observe and examine. However, since less of
the URL is visible in the browser window, it might also
be more difficult. The fact that our study is performed
on the participants own mobile devices might also make
it easier to identify fraudulent websites, since some
websites might open in apps and some might already be
logged in.
The rest of this work is structured as follows: Next,
we sketch related work. Especially, we explain two
previous studies that elaborated on the same aspects
as we. Afterwards, we explain our research method,
before we illustrate the results of our study. Then,
these results are discussed, and the threats of validity
explained. Finally, we conclude our work and suggest
future work.
2. Related Work
This study is based on the studies of Dhamija et
al. [7] and Alsharnouby et al. [8]. These studies
use a very similar methodology except for the fact that
Alsharnouby et al. [8] utilize eye tracking technology to
investigate where users look when they try to determine
the legitimacy of a website. From the reports it can be
concluded that studies were most likely performed in
North America. The method used in both studies was
that the users participating got to look at a collection of
websites (24 and 19 websites respectively). For each
website, the user was asked to decide whether they
believed the website was legitimate or not.
The average success rate found by Alsharnouby
et al. [8] for correctly identifying a website as
either legitimate or not was 64 % compared to 58 %
by Dhamija et al. [7]. However, considering the
non-legitimate sites the success rate was 53 % and 54
% respectively. Even though 9 years passed between
the studies, it does not seem like users are getting
better at identifying fraudulent websites. For legitimate
sites only the success rate was 79 % [8] and 75 %
[7]. Drawing conclusions from comparisons of the
studies should however be done with care since they
used different websites for their studies even though the
spoofing techniques used were similar. Additionally,
the studies were limited to 22 and 21 participators
respectively, meaning the results does not necessarily
represent the average user.
Other related work is considering the transfer of
the phishing concept to the mobile domain. Felt and
Wagner [10] examine how vulnerable smartphones are
to phishing. The study notes that security indicators
are less visible for the user on smartphones, both when
determining the identity of a website in a browser
window and the identity of a running application,
due to the limited screen size. Another risk factor
on smartphones is that users often click on links in
other applications (e.g., social media apps), which
then display the website in an embedded browser
window. The embedded browser window shows even
less information about the website being visited, with
smaller text.
Goel and Jain [11] bring up the fact that smartphones
introduces new paths for phishing attacks. 87 % of
all phishing attempts on smartphones are not carried
out using email. Through text messages (SMS), MMS,
and trusted mobile applications users are fooled to click
links, get redirected, or share data. According to the
article, mobile devices are three times more vulnerable
to phishing attacks than desktop computers because of
screen size, lack of awareness and inconvenience of
user input. Therefore, separate techniques are needed
to avoid these attacks.
Shahriar et al. [12] describe several mitigation
techniques as suggestions against phishing on mobile
devices. One technique is to analyze IP packets with
machine learning. Another is to analyze if the layout of
the visited website seems to be copying another websites
layout. Another method to identify phishing websites
is static analysis. The article mentions MobiFish,
an anti-phishing application that detects IP URLs and
warns the user. It also identifies forms on the website
and warns the user if the website requests login-details.
If it does, MobiFish searches for the host name in
a whitelist. If the host name is not whitelisted and
not displaying its domain name (excluding TLD) in
the websites content, the user is presented with a
warning. Other techniques about user authentication
are discussed. The authors of the article suggest
implementing several of these techniques to combat
phishing.
3. Research Method
To answer our research question, we interviewed
20 users about their experience and reasoning while
looking at legitimate and spoofed websites. We spoofed
eight popular websites and their URLs using different
techniques and provided nine legitimate websites. The
participants were directed to a navigation site, which
contained links to all the 17 web pages in random order.
The participants were recruited by sending out






25 M 4 h Android Chrome 4
22 M 3 h Android Chrome 2
57 F 6 h iOS Safari 2
22 M 5 h iOS Safari 2
57 F 2 h iOS Safari 0
50 F 2 h iOS Safari 2
20 F 5 h iOS Safari 3
29 F 2 h iOS Safari 2
56 M 3 h iOS Safari 4
22 F 4 h iOS Chrome 1
40 F 3 h iOS Safari 1
39 M 3 h iOS Safari 3
21 M 4 h Android Chrome 4
51 M 3 h iOS Safari 0
57 M 1 h Android Chrome 3
35 F 2 h iOS Safari 3
54 M 3 h iOS Safari 5
30 F 4 h Android Samsung
Internet
2
56 M 5 h iOS Safari 2
68 F 1 h iOS Safari 0
Table 1. Demographic Information on Participants
two different Facebook groups. We also asked friends
and family to recommend participants. Participants
were rewarded with a movie ticket. We asked about
the participants age, sex, and technical proficiency (on
a scale from 0-5 as used by Alsharnouby et al. [8]) . We
also asked about the participants smartphone operating
system, browser as well as average time spent on their
smartphone each day (actively), as illustrated in Table 1.
The users could use their own smartphone to make
the study more realistic, and not have the UI of a
different browser or operating system be a confusing
factor. All interviews were conducted through the video
conference app Zoom where participants shared their
screen to make it easier for us to observe their behavior.
For every website shown, we asked about the reasoning
behind the participants decision and the difficulty they
had to decide (on a scale 1-5). This is information
gathered in previous similar studies and is therefore
relevant when comparing our results.
To create the spoofed websites URL, we relied on
five different techniques:
U1 A mistyped URL close to the original (e.g.
ablidris.com instead of adlibris.com).
U2 A URL that is quite different from the
original but might come off as legitimate
(e.g. swedbank-privat.se instead of swedbank.se).
U3 A different top-level domain than the original (e.g.
elgiganten.online instead of elgiganten.se).
U4 A sub domain used for deception
(e.g. outlook.com-secure.live instead of
outlook.live.com/owa).
U5 A URL consisting of a regular IP address (e.g.
35.228.129.249).
The websites were cloned using the tools HTTrack,
wget, and the Firefox plugin SingleFile. For some
clones manual tinkering was necessary in order to get
the clone working properly. For example, there could
be some JavaScript on the page that was not executing
properly in the cloned version. Not all pages had all of
their functionality cloned perfectly. However, this was
not considered a problem, since it was found interesting
to discover if users would be able to notice these flaws
and raise suspicion.
To decide which websites to choose, we considered
the top websites in Sweden using alexa.com and
similarweb.com, as we wanted to ensure that most
participants had visited the web page before. Our
focus was on e-commerce (E), finance (F) and social
media (SM) sites, since all those pages require login
details. E-commerce and banking websites often require
financial information, which motivates a phishing
attack. In Table 2, we present all spoofed websites
and in Table 3 all legitimate websites used in the study.
We decided not to have for every legitimate website a
spoofed website and vice versa, to avoid the possibility
for the participant to deduct the status of a website due to
its appearance before. Figure 1 illustrates ablidris.com
(S5) on the left, and the legit adlibris.com (L6) on the
right shown in Safari on iOS 13.
Before we performed the real study, we performed a
pilot study on three volunteering PhD Students studying
at our university. This pilot study was performed to
test our methodology and receive feedback. The gained
feedback resulted in an added progress indicator on the
study website, a few fixed problems with the spoofed
websites, and changing of the link styling so that visited
links would not turn purple.
As the pilot study was finished, we started the real
study. First, we gave a short introduction to phishing
to each participant. We explained that phishing is
often performed by creating a fake website mimicking
a legitimate one to retrieve login or bank details from
targets. Then, we presented the participant with a
scenario inspired by the work of Dhamija et al. [7]:
”Imagine that you receive a message from a trusted
person or company that asks you to click on one of the
following links. Imagine that you decide to click on the
Page 7175
ID Type URL Description Method
S1 SM https://fb.login.com.se Facebook login U4
S2 F IP ADDRESS (http) Klarna front page U5
S3 SM http://twitter.loginsecurity.online Twitter login U4
S4 E https://ablidris.com/ Adlibris front page U1
S5 F https://swedbank-privat.se Swedbank front page U2
S6 F https://skattesverket.se Skatteverket front page U1
S7 SM https://outlook.com-secure.live Outlook front page U4
S8 E https://elgiganten.online Elgiganten front page U3
Table 2. Spoofed Websites
ID Type URL Description
L1 SM https://outlook.live.com Outlook front page
L2 F https://internetbanken.privat.nordea.se/nsp/login Nordea login page
L3 F https://klarna.com Klarna front page
L4 E https://cdon.se Cdon.com front page
L5 SM https://i.reddit.com Reddit mobile front page
L6 E https://adlibris.com Adlibris front page
L7 F https://paypal.com PayPal front page
L8 F https://handelsbanken.se Handelsbanken front page
L9 E https://tradera.com Tradera front page
Table 3. Legitimate Websites
link to see if it is a legitimate website or a fraudulent
copy of that website.”
Afterwards, the participants were directed to the
navigation site of our study. It was explained to the
user that the websites would be shown in a random order
and that the same website could appear more than once.
The latter was not true, as we included both spoofed and
legitimate versions of some websites. If the user thought
that a website would only appear once they might be
able to use that information when the page appeared
the second time. Finally, the participants were told to
identify the websites as legitimate or spoofed. We stated
that they could use the websites as any other website, but
we emphasized that the first page they arrived at, was
the one they were supposed to identify as legitimate or
spoofed. This was clarified since our spoofed websites
contained links to the legitimate version of each website.
4. Results
4.1. Demographics
20 persons participated in the study, where 50 %
were female and 50 % were male. 25 % used Android
and the rest used iOS. The browser Safari was used by
70 %, followed by Chrome with 25 %, and Samsung
Internet 5 %. Participants received 1 point for each
correctly identified site and the total scores for each
participant ranged from 7 to 17. The average number
of points for all participants was 11.75 with a standard
deviation (sd) of 3.04.
Furthermore, we calculated the correlation
coefficient using Pearson Product-Moment Correlation
[13] (N = 20) when comparing two sets of demographic
characteristics. When comparing two populations
t-test was used. A p-value < 0.05 was considered
statistically significant for all tests. We could not
discover a significant correlation between score and
age (r = -0.243, p = .30), between score and technical
proficiency (r = 0.408, p = .074), nor between score and
active smartphone use per day (r = 0.382, p = .097).
However, we recognize a statistically significant
correlation between score and sex. The mean score was
10.3 for females (sd = 2.39) and 13.9 for males (sd =
2.90). Lastly, we performed Levene’s test [14] to ensure
the homogeneity of the groups (F = 0.100, p = .755) and
the t-test [15] (t(18) = 2.602, p = .018). The result shows
that there is a difference between the male and female
groups.
4.2. Recognition Rates
Following, we present the success rate of correctly
identifying all our websites. The number shown in
parentheses is the average confidence level (1-5) that
participants reported for their correct/incorrect decision.
Table 4 shows results of all the spoofed websites and
Table 5 for the legitimate websites. The average number
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Figure 1. Left the Spoofed Website and Right the Legitimate Website
ID Correct Incorrect
S1 90 % (3.5) 10 % (4.0)
S2 80 % (4.4) 20 % (4.5)
S3 65 % (3.5) 35 % (3.6)
S4 70 % (4.7) 30 % (3.8)
S5 50 % (3.7) 50 % (3.9)
S6 80 % (4.4) 20 % (4.5)
S7 60 % (2.7) 40 % (4.0)
S8 60 % (3.6) 40 % (3.9)
Total 69 % (3.7) 31 % (3.9)
Table 4. Results Spoofed Websites
of correct guesses on all sites was 13.8 (69 % of the
participants) and the median number of correct guesses
was 14 (69 % of the participants). The standard
deviation of number of correct guesses on all sites was
3.26.
4.3. Strategies
Several strategies and combinations of strategies
were identified during the interviews. A participant was
a user of a specific strategy if s/he mentioned something
regarding the specific strategy at some point while
evaluating the sites or if we observed the participant
using the strategy. For example, if a user mentioned the
padlock icon in the address bar at some point, s/he was
ID Correct Incorrect
L1 75 % (3.7) 25 % (2.4)
L2 35 % (3.7) 65 % (3.0)
L3 65 % (3.5) 35 % (3.6)
L4 55 % (4.2) 45 % (3.3)
L5 50 % (3.2) 50 % (3.5)
L6 75 % (4.1) 25 % (2.6)
L7 80 % (3.6) 20 % (3.3)
L8 90 % (4.1) 10 % (4.0)
L9 95 % (4.0) 5 % (3.0)
Total 65 % (3.8) 35 % (3.2)
Table 5. Results Legitimate Websites
considered using strategy 5 (”Using security indicators
in the browser”).
Strategy 1: Evaluating the sites design Participants
using this strategy considered the look and aesthetics of
the website such as font, logos and layout. 90 % of the
participants mentioned the sites design at least once in
our study as a factor when deciding. Those who used
this strategy at least once, had an average success rate
of 68 % on all pages, compared to 76 % for the two
participants that did not mention the sites design.
L2 Nordea and L5 Reddit are two examples where
evaluating design lead to the wrong conclusion for
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legitimate sites. 25 % and 35 % respectively mistakenly
classified the sites as spoofs with the design as
motivation.
Strategy 2: Evaluating the sites functionality This
strategy involves evaluating the sites behavior when
interacting with different elements on the website such
as links, buttons, forms and interactive animations. 95 %
of our users evaluated the sites functionality at least once
when trying to decide a sites legitimacy. This included
participants clicking links on the site. Those using this
strategy had an average success rate of 68 % compared
to 82 % for the one participant who did not use this
strategy at all.
An example of where this strategy was successful
was when one participant noticed that the ”Visa
Produkt” (show product) button did not work on the
spoofed site S8 (Elgiganten) which helped him identify
the site as spoofed.
Strategy 3: Evaluating the sites information
Participants using Strategy 3 considered the information
displayed on the website. This includes wording,
spelling, type of information, and language. The
difference from Strategy 1 is that this strategy considers
what information is displayed instead of how it is
displayed. 90 % of the participants used this strategy
at least once during the interview. Those who used it
had an average success rate of 70 %, compared to 74 %
for the two participants who did not use it.
In some special cases users got a personalized
version of a legitimate website. For example, one
user was logged in to Outlook on their phone and the
link to the legitimate Outlook front page redirected
them to their inbox. The user used this as a basis for
their decision that the website was legitimate. Some
users also used the reverse argument, claiming that they
should already be logged in on a specific site. Reddit
opened in an app (instead of browser window) for 3
participants and Tradera for 4 participants.
The evaluating information-strategy had the most
potential on the spoofed sites with outdated content.
Only one user found outdated information and used it as
a basis for labeling a website illegitimate. This was on
S8 (Elgiganten), which described a weekly offer which
was valid until a date that had already passed.
Strategy 4: Evaluating the sites URL A participant
is considered a user of the strategy if they talked about
the appearance of the URL at least once during the study.
This strategy was used by 80 % of the participants.
Participants using the strategy had an average success
rate of 75 %, whereas participants not using it had a
44 % success rate. Some users were inconsistent and
mentioned the URL at some point but did not mention it
for most of the sites. Two users only mentioned the sites
URL on one of the sites they evaluated. The maximum
number of times the URL was mentioned was 16 which
was done by two users. The average times mentioned
(for those who utilized the strategy) was 9.2 (sd = 5.32).
A statistically significant correlation was found between
participant scores and number of times they mentioned
a sites URL (r = 0.80, p = .000028).
On S1 (fb.login.com.se) 45 % of participants used
the URL as motivation to correctly identify the site
as spoofed. Even though the strategy was successful
in general, it did not guarantee correct identification
of spoofed websites. For example, one participant
mentioned the URL of S5 (swedbank-privat.se) and still
considered it legitimate. Two participants inspected
or mentioned the URL of S7 (outlook.com-secure.live)
but still classified it as legitimate. Some participants
were suspicious about legitimate sites in Swedish having
.com and not .se as TLD. For example, one participant
incorrectly classified the legitimate klarna website (L3)
as a spoof since it used .com instead of .se. On
the legitimate site cdon.se (L4), the domain name was
expected to be cdon.com by several participants.
The way the URL was displayed in the mobile
browser window differed. One participant thought that
the URL for S8 (Elgiganten) was giganten.online instead
of elgiganten.online, since the address bar was cropped,
caused by a smaller screen.
Strategy 5: Using security indicators in the browser
This strategy involves looking at and interpreting the
browsers security warnings and information displayed in
the address bar, which differs along different browsers.
The strategy was used at least once by 35 % of the
participants. Those using it had an 80 % average success
rate identifying all websites compared to 63 % average
success rate for those who never used this strategy. One
participant inspected certificates.
There were 5 legitimate sites (L2 Nordea, L4 CDON,
L7 Paypal, L8 Handelsbanken and L9 Tradera) using
EV-certificates. These sites had their host name and
the padlock icon displayed in green in Safari, but not in
Chrome or Samsung Internet. Only 14 % of participants
using Safari mentioned the green padlock or green URL.
One of those two participants mentioned the green URL
on L2 (Nordea), but incorrectly classified the site as a
spoof.
Strategy 6: Using a search engine to find the
legitimate site One participant googled sites s/he was
unsure about in a separate browser tab to determine
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if URLs and website content was identical. That
participant had a success rate of 100 % on all sites,
compared to the average of 67 % success rate for the
other 19 participants.
Combinations of strategies All participants used a
combination of at least three strategies. Participants
who only relied on a combination of the website
content-strategies (Strategy 1, 2 and 3), were the same
group of people who did not utilize Strategy 4 (URL
check). They had a low 44 % average success rate. The
three worst performing participants in the study, with a
success rate of 47 %, 47 % and 41 % respectively were
all a part of this group.
Multiple participants showed that they did not
understand that website content can be cloned quite
easily. For example one participant said that ”It would
be too exhausting to make a fake site like this” when
mistakenly identifying S7 (outlook.com-secure.live) as
legitimate.
Every participant who used strategy 5 (security
indicators) also used strategy 4 (URL) and these
participants had an average success rate of 80 %. Those
who used strategy 4 but not strategy 5 had an average
success rate of 71 %.
The three best performing participants all checked
the URL (strategy 4) but only one of them mentioned
security indicators (strategy 5). These three had a
success rate of 100 %, 89 % and 89 % respectively.
5. Discussion
5.1. Spoofed websites
The three spoofing sites which fooled the largest
number of participants used different URL spoofing
techniques. Accordingly, there are no indications that
one technique would be superior. However, they have in
common that all three URLs contain the full name of the
organization they are imposing as.
The spoofed sites that misspelled the organization
name, S4 (ablidris.com) and S6 (skattesverket.se) fooled
a relatively small portion of participants, 30 % and 20
% respectively. Maybe these sites would have been
more successful in a real-world context, as we asked our
participants to identify spoofed websites, which leads to
a higher caution.
S2 (Klarna with IP address URL) and S1
(fb.login.com.se) were the spoofed sites that fooled the
smallest amount of people. This indicates that the URL
of a website is important for a user when deciding if
a website is legitimate. Only one person thought the
fake Facebook login site was legitimate even though
the content of the site looked exactly like the real
mobile Facebook login page. The usage of fb instead
of facebook in the URL is probably a part of the
explanation. The login.com.se domain name also felt
suspicious for many participants.
The fact that the Klarna site (S2) with an IP address
URL did not fool a lot of people is not surprising.
The site also used http instead of https which meant
that Safari displayed the text ”Not secure” to the left
of the URL. Four people thought that the site was
legitimate, none of those mentioned the IP address. It
is noteworthy that this site fooled more people than
the spoofed Facebook login site despite having an IP
address URL. One explanation for that could be that the
Facebook site (S1) was a login page, while the Klarna
site (S2) was a front page.
5.2. Legitimate sites
The three legitimate sites that was hardest for our
participants to identify correctly were L2 (Nordea),
L5 (Reddit mobile) and L4 (CDON). This is not very
surprising, since Reddit and Nordea use an old-looking
design that many people mistakenly classified the sites
as spoofs with the design as motivation. Nordea was
not designed for mobile screens and had a long URL
with two sub domains. Cdon.se had a success rate of
just 55 % even though the URL was not suspicious, and
they even had an EV-certificate. The reason for the low
success rate was that many of the participants expected
the domain for cdon.se to be cdon.com. Cdon.com was
previously the brand name of cdon that was used in
commercials and logos. Some participants also expected
cdon to have a different product range.
Tradera (L9), Handelsbanken (L8) and Paypal (L7)
were the easiest sites for participants to identify as
legitimate. Tradera is a marketplace where people buy
and sell almost anything. A reason that so many people
identified it as legit may be that the site had a lot of
content, displaying auctions with the time remaining.
All the three sites have a clear URL containing only
the organization name and a TLD which probably
contributed to the legitimate impression. A modern
design was also a common denominator for the three
sites. Paypal had some flaws in the language used on
the site. For example, there was an incomplete sentence
that read ”Ta reda p varfr ver 255 miljoner.” (”Find
out why over 255 million.”) Most participants (80 %)
successfully identified the site as legitimate anyways.
An interesting find regarding security indicators was
that most Safari users that could see the green URL and
padlock in the address bar (representing EV-certificates)
did not know how to use this information. This indicates
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that EV-certificates and indicators for it has not been
understood by most users. This might be the reason
for why most browsers does not indicate EV-certificates
anymore. End users simply do not know how to interpret
them.
The legitimate login page for Nordea (L2) was
classified as a spoof by 65 % of participants while the
spoofed Outlook page (S7) was identified as a spoof
by 60 % of participants. This result indicates that the
strategies used are not very effective and that a site with
older looking design can be more suspicious looking
than one with a spoofed domain name. Another possible
reason for this could be that a login page made users
more suspicious than a front page.
5.3. Participants strategies
It was noticed that almost all participants depended
on a sites information, design, and functionality when
deciding if it was legitimate or spoofed. This seems
like an obvious thing to do when visiting a new
site, but it is often not a successful strategy. This
is indicated by the results where participants with a
completely content-based strategy had a 44 % success
rate compared to 75 % for those who mentioned the
URL at least once.
Since there was always a 50 % chance to answer
correctly some users applying only content-based
strategies still got a decent result by discovering what
they thought were errors in the spoofed websites design
and information. For example, one user correctly
identified S1 (fake Facebook login) as a spoof stating
that the font in the Facebook logo was incorrect even
though it was the real logo.
Looking at the security indicators and evaluating
the URL proved to be a more successful than relying
solely on the website content. 80 % of participants
investigated the URL at some point and they had an
average success rate of 75 %. One interesting find
was that some users applied the URL-strategy once and
then never used it again. A very significant and strong
correlation was found between the success rate and the
number of times a user mentioned the URL during the
study. Furthermore, the users who not only mentioned
the URL but also the browsers security indicators had an
even better success rate at 77 %.
It is likely that the users that did not look at the
URL had a bad understanding of how the web works.
Therefore, it is a bit surprising that no significant
correlation was found between technical proficiency
and performance or between daily smartphone usage
and performance. It is possible that the five questions
that were asked to determine a participants technical
proficiency were not accurate enough.
The only user with a 100 % successful strategy
googled sites and compared them to the sites he was
directed to in the interview. This is the most fool proof
strategy identified and includes both URL and website
content as factors. This strategy would also work when
visiting a new site that you have not visited before,
assuming it is a spoof and not a unique fraudulent
website that the search engine has indexed. It is
possible that other participants thought that they would
not be allowed to use external sources to investigate the
legitimacy of a website, but the instructions given did
not limit the methods participants could use in any way.
5.4. Smartphone browser improvements
One of the main flaws made by participants when
deciding if a spoofed website was legitimate or spoofed
was to not look at the URL at all and focusing solely
on content. Another flaw was misinterpreting the URL.
This can be considered an error on the users side, but
browsers can also affect how the users interpret the
URL.
One way for browsers to make this easier for users
could be to display the URL more visibly or even double
check if the user really wants to move from one domain
to another. This could of course be intrusive and make
the browsing experience less comfortable.
A less intrusive approach could be to highlight the
domain name somehow, like displaying it in a different
color or higher opacity. This would make it easier to
interpret the URL, as the domain name is the most
important part of the URL when deciding a websites
legitimacy. The host name outlook.com-secure.live
(S7) in our study would perhaps not have been quite
as effective if the domain name com-secure.live was
highlighted. This is already done today in the desktop
version of the browser Firefox. However, this might not
help users not aware of what a domain name or URL is
at all.
To expand on this idea, you could take it one
step further and only show the domain name in the
address bar. Currently Safari on iOS only show the
host name but as was shown in the spoofed Outlook
example, the host name can be deceptive. If only the
domain name was shown the address bar for spoofed
Outlook would have read com-secure.live instead of
outlook.com-secure.live which probably would have
raised suspicion among more participants. One could
claim that it would be more difficult to know what
website you are currently on if you could only see the
domain name but it would still be possible to click the
address bar and see the full URL at any time. This slight
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inconvenience could be worth it if there is a security
benefit.
Another thing that makes it more difficult
interpreting the domain name is that the address
bar becomes hidden on Chrome when the user scrolls
down on a webpage. The design choice makes sense
since smartphones have less screen space and as much
as possible is used for showing content. Safari on the
other makes the address bar smaller when the user
scrolls down on a page but never hides it completely.
It is likely that this approach has significant security
benefits, even we did not find such in our experiments.
5.5. Comparing with previous studies
The participants in this study had a better average
success rate than the users in the works of Dhamija
et al. [7] and Alsharnouby et al. [8]. The average
success rate was 58 %, 64 % and 69 % by Dhamija et al.
[7], Alsharnouby et al. [8], and this study respectively.
For spoofed sites only the success rates were 54 %,
53 % and 69 %. For legitimate sites only the rates
were 75 %, 79 % and 69 %. There could be numerous
reasons for these differences, like different websites,
different participants, or chance. An obvious difference
between the studies was that we let participants use their
own mobile devices. This led to the fact that some
websites opened in mobile applications and that some
were already logged in to a legitimate website. This was
used by some participants to decide whether a website
was spoofed or legitimate.
In previous studies, participants were considerably
better at identifying legitimate websites correctly than
spoofed websites. This was not the case in this study
where the success rate was equal for both legit and
spoofed websites. The participants in this study were
more suspicious and more likely to consider websites
fake overall. This could be due to cultural differences.
Dhamija et al. [7] and Alsharnouby et al. [8] performed
their studies in North America whereas this study was
performed in Sweden.
6. Threats to Validity
The highest threat to validity in the study is that a
couple of websites behaved differently on Safari and
Chrome, and that all pages functionality was not cloned
perfectly. The spoofed Klarna page (S2) had ”Download
our app”-banner that only showed up on Safari. This
was by their design and the same behavior was seen on
the legitimate Klarna page (L3). The same difference
was noticed on swedbank-privat.se (S5) after the study
had been conducted, but in that case the same behavior
was not seen on the legitimate site swedbank.se. This
combined with many other variables makes it difficult
to draw any conclusions about what URL spoofing
technique was the most successful.
One other shortcoming of our study is that all
participants were aware that the study was conducted
and that their task was to identify legitimate and spoofed
websites. This probably made the participants more
careful and more observant. The results of the study
indicate an upper bound of peoples ability to verify the
legitimacy of a website.
The technical proficiency-questions in our interview
might have been to arbitrary. They were slightly more
focused on the web in general but perhaps they were
not good enough to indicate the technical knowledge
of a user. In future studies a different way to measure
technical proficiency and a more precise definition
of what is meant by technical proficiency would be
beneficial. However, we decided to follow the approach
of Alsharnouby et al. [8] to create comparability
between our studies.
7. Conclusion
The results indicate that almost all (> 90 %) of
the participants evaluate a sites information, design and
functionality when deciding if a site is legitimate or
spoofed. This was not a successful strategy when used
on its own, leading to a mere 44 % success rate for
the few users who never mentioned the URL or security
indicators. However, most participants (80 %) evaluated
the URL of a website at least once during the interview.
These people performed a lot better and had a 75 %
success rate of classifying sites correctly. Those who
not only mentioned the URL but also mentioned the
browsers security indicators performed even better still
with an 80 % success rate.
The results indicate that smartphone users are not
more susceptible to phishing than computer users.
About the share of participants evaluated the URL
at least once during our study compared to previous
studies made on desktop computers. No significant
correlation was found between scores and age or active
time spent on smartphone per day. This was also
the case in the previous similar studies. Technical
proficiency was not found to correlate with performance
either. This is surprising since knowledge of how URLs
and the web works in general seemed to be important
during the interviews, but at the same time it matches
previous studies results. More users correctly identified
spoofed and legitimate websites in this study compared
to previous studies. One reason is probably that our
participants used their own devices and some websites
opened in an app or were already logged in to their
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account.
Many users were confused about the meaning
of padlock icon (HTTPS) and green text/padlock
in Safari (EV-certificates). The domain name
was sometimes hidden/partly hidden on participants
smartphone screens, which could make identifying a
spoofed website more difficult compared to a browser
on a computer screen. Even when participants looked
at the URL they were sometimes fooled by the spoofed
websites. To combat this, browsers could display the
URL in a clearer way. One suggestion is for browsers
to only show the domain name in the address bar.
This could help in the cases where the sub domain is
deceptive.
Overall, the quantitative results of the study could
show some indications when compared to the previous
studies. We will take this indications to conduct a larger
study in future to draw more definitive conclusions.
With regards to user behavior it became clear that the
participants that put too much emphasis on the website
content performed very poorly in the study. Those
who mentioned security indicators performed a lot better
even though many of them did not fully understand their
meaning.
Our study lacks a few perspectives that will be
considered in our future study. Firstly, it lacks a
big population which could lead to more conclusions.
Secondly, it lacks a variety of spoofing techniques
unrelated to the actual URL of the sites. One spoofing
technique that would be interesting to test is the
inception bar, a spoofed address bar suggested by James
H. Fisher [16]. Thirdly, it might be of interest to research
the influence of different aspects on the identification
rate, like using different browsers, demographics, or
security awareness.
Neither Dhamija et al. [7], Alsharnouby et al. [8],
nor our results show a correlation between performance
and technical proficiency. This is something we found
surprising and it would be interesting to research this
further. In that case, it would be wise to clearly define
what technical proficiency means and try to find an
accurate way of testing it. Further, it was previously
mentioned that the reason for the difference in success
rate when comparing with previous studies could be
due to cultural differences, which can be of interest for
future research as well. Future studies could focus on
comparing different browser security indicators to make
a more thorough analysis about which are more efficient.
Acknowledgment
This work has received funding from the European
Union’s H2020 research and innovation programme
under the Grant Agreement no. 832907, the Swedish
Energy Agency, and the Swedish Governmental Agency
for Innovation Systems (Vinnova).
References
[1] BBC, 2020 (accessed 2020-09-21). https://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-51474109.
[2] T. N. Jagatic, N. A. Johnson, M. Jakobsson, and
F. Menczer, “Social phishing,” Communications of the
ACM, vol. 50, no. 10, pp. 94–100, 2007.
[3] Verizon, “Data breach investigations report 2019,” 2019.
[4] S. Das, A. Kim, Z. Tingle, and C. Nippert-Eng,
“All about phishing exploring user research through
a systematic literature review,” in Proceedings of the
Thirteenth International Symposium on Human Aspects
of Information Security & Assurance, University of
Plymouth, 2019.
[5] A. Oest, Y. Safei, A. Doupe, G.-J. Ahn, B. Wardman, and
G. Warner, “Inside a phisher’s mind: Understanding the
anti-phishing ecosystem through phishing kit analysis,”
in APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research
(eCrime), (Piscataway, New Jersey), pp. 1–12, IEEE,
2018.
[6] APWG, “Phishing activity trends report 3rd quarter
2019.”
[7] R. Dhamija, J. D. Tygar, and M. Hearst, “Why phishing
works,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (R. Grinter, ed.),
ACM Digital Library, (New York, NY), p. 581, ACM,
2006.
[8] M. Alsharnouby, F. Alaca, and S. Chiasson,
“Why phishing still works: User strategies for
combating phishing attacks,” International Journal
of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 82, pp. 69–82, 2015.




[10] A. P. Felt and D. Wagner, “Phishing on mobile devices,”
in Web 2.0 Security and Privacy, pp. 1–10, IEEE, 2011.
[11] D. Goel and A. K. Jain, “Mobile phishing attacks
and defence mechanisms: State of art and open
research challenges,” Computers & Security, vol. 73,
pp. 519–544, 2018.
[12] H. Shahriar, C. Zhang, S. Dunn, R. Bronte, A. Sahlan,
and K. Tarmissi, “Mobile anti-phishing: Approaches
and challenges,” Information Security Journal: A Global
Perspective, vol. 28, no. 6, pp. 178–193, 2019.
[13] K. Pearson, “Notes on regression and inheritance in the
case of two parents,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of
London, vol. 58, pp. 240–242, 1895.
[14] M. B. Brown and A. B. Forsythe, “Robust tests for
the equality of variances,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, vol. 69, no. 346, pp. 364–367,
1974.
[15] E. L. Lehmann, “The probable error of a mean,”
Biometrika, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–25, 1908.
[16] J. H. Fisher, 2019 (accessed 2020-09-21).
https://jameshfisher.com/2019/04/27/
the-inception-bar-a-new-phishing-method/.
Page 7182
